A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets

Artikel

We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm. The usual core may be empty. The setwise-stable set coincides with the pairwise-stable set and with the predictions of a non-cooperative bargaining model. The setwise-stable set possesses the conflict/coincidence of interest properties from many-to-one, and one-to-one models. The theory parallels the standard theory of stability for many-to-one, and one-to-one, models. We provide results for a number of core-like solutions, besides the setwise-stable set.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 1 ; Year: 2006 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 233-273 ; New York, NY: The Econometric Society

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
• Thema: Two-sided matching ; cooperative game theory ; core

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Echenique, Federico ; Oviedo, Jorge
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): The Econometric Society
• (wo): New York, NY
• (wann): 2006

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150080
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ