A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets

Artikel

We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm. The usual core may be empty. The setwise-stable set coincides with the pairwise-stable set and with the predictions of a non-cooperative bargaining model. The setwise-stable set possesses the conflict/coincidence of interest properties from many-to-one, and one-to-one models. The theory parallels the standard theory of stability for many-to-one, and one-to-one, models. We provide results for a number of core-like solutions, besides the setwise-stable set.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 1 ; Year: 2006 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 233-273 ; New York, NY: The Econometric Society

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
• Subject: Two-sided matching ; cooperative game theory ; core

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Echenique, Federico ; Oviedo, Jorge
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): The Econometric Society
• (where): New York, NY
• (when): 2006

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150080
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET