Arbeitspapier
Social Security in Germany: A Prey of Political Opportunism?
This paper examines how politicians influenced social security policy in Germany. Using yearly data from the German Pension Insurance from 1957 to 2005, revenues as well as expenditures are analysed in linear regression models, respectively. In accordance with opportunistic political behaviour, revenues from contributions decreased in pre-election years. Most important, pension expenditures increased in election years. Interestingly, the CDU/FDP governments provided higher subsidies to the social security system than the grand coalition and the SPD/GR government. Overall, there is no evidence for the prospect, that left coalitions caused higher intergenerational redistribution than right governments.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: DIW Discussion Papers ; No. 677
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Social Security and Public Pensions
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Thema
-
social security
partisan politics
pension system
Sozialpolitik
Sozialversicherung
Politischer Konjunkturzyklus
Opportunismus
Deutschland
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Potrafke, Niklas
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
- (wo)
-
Berlin
- (wann)
-
2007
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Potrafke, Niklas
- Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
Entstanden
- 2007