Arbeitspapier
Minority positions in the German Council of Economic Experts: A political economic analysis
I investigate minority votes in the German Council of Economic Experts. The dataset contains information on the voting behavior of the council members over the period 19712011. The results show that the best predictor of minority voting is being nominated by the trade unions: a council member nominated by the trade unions isabout 70 percentage points more likely to vote against the majority opinion of the German Council of Economic Experts. This voting pattern indicates that the channel of political appointment influences voting behavior.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: ifo Working Paper ; No. 160
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Thema
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Decision making in committees
minority voting
policy preferences
German Council of Economic Experts
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Potrafke, Niklas
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2013
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Potrafke, Niklas
- ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich
Entstanden
- 2013