Arbeitspapier

Minority Positions in the German Council of Economic Experts: A Political Economic Analysis

I investigate minority votes in the German Council of Economic Experts. The dataset contains information on the voting behavior of the council members over the period 1971-2011. The results show that the best predictor of minority voting is being nominated by the trade unions: a council member nominated by the trade unions is about 70 percentage points more likely to vote against the majority opinion of the German Council of Economic Experts. This voting pattern indicates that the channel of political appointment influences voting behavior.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4206

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Thema
decision making in committees
minority voting
policy preferences
German Council of Economic Experts

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Potrafke, Niklas
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Potrafke, Niklas
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2013

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