Arbeitspapier

Minority positions in the German Council of Economic Experts: A political economic analysis

I investigate minority votes in the German Council of Economic Experts. The dataset contains information on the voting behavior of the council members over the period 1971–2011. The results show that the best predictor of minority voting is being nominated by the trade unions: a council member nominated by the trade unions isabout 70 percentage points more likely to vote against the majority opinion of the German Council of Economic Experts. This voting pattern indicates that the channel of political appointment influences voting behavior.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: ifo Working Paper ; No. 160

Classification
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Subject
Decision making in committees
minority voting
policy preferences
German Council of Economic Experts

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Potrafke, Niklas
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich
(where)
Munich
(when)
2013

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Potrafke, Niklas
  • ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich

Time of origin

  • 2013

Other Objects (12)