Arbeitspapier
Multitasking and Subjective Performance Evaluations: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in a Bank
We study the incentive effects of grating supervisors access to objective performance information when agents work on multiple tasks. We first analyze a formal model showing that incentives are lower powered when supervisors have no access to objective measures but assess performance subjectively by gathering information. This incentive loss is more pronounced when the span of control is larger and incentives are distorted towards more profitable tasks. We then investigate a field experiment conducted in a bank. In the treatment group managers obtained access to objective performance measures which raised efforts and profits. We find that the effects are driven by larger branches and lower margin products.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 11581
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- Subject
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incentives
subjective performance evaluation
multitasking
field experiment
bank
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Manthei, Kathrin
Sliwka, Dirk
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
- (where)
-
Bonn
- (when)
-
2018
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Manthei, Kathrin
- Sliwka, Dirk
- Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Time of origin
- 2018
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