Arbeitspapier
Auction Design without Commitment
We study auction design when parties cannot commit to the mechanism. The seller may change the rules of the game any number of times and the buyers may choose their outside option at any stage of the game. A dynamic consistency condition and an optimality condition property are defined to characterize the seller's mechanism selection behavior. The unique stationary mechanism selection rule that meets the conditions is the English auction.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Discussion paper ; No. 44
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Auctions
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- Subject
-
auctions
commitment
consistency
one-deviation property
stationarity
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Vartiainen, Hannu
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)
- (where)
-
Turku
- (when)
-
2009
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Vartiainen, Hannu
- Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)
Time of origin
- 2009
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