An Auction Market for Journal Articles

Konferenzbeitrag

We recommend that an auction market replace the current system for submitting academic papers and show a strict Pareto-improvement of equilibrium. Besides the benefits of speed, this mechanmism increases the average quality of articles and journals and rewards editors and referees for their effort. In addition, the academic dollars for papers sold at auction go to the authors, editors and referees of cited articles. This nonpecuniary income indicates academic impact - facilitating decisions on tenure and promotion. We discuss practical issues and demonstrate that the auction market is implementable without relaxing editors' current pecuniary or time constraints.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Improving Productivity and Efficiency of Economic Science ; No. A2-V1

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Role of Economics; Role of Economists; Market for Economists ; Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact ; Auctions
• Subject: Academic Journals ; Academic Productivity ; Market Design

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Prüfer, Jens ; Zetland, David
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Verein für Socialpolitik
• (where): Frankfurt a. M.
• (when): 2010

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37221
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET