Konferenzbeitrag

Strategic complexities in the combinatorial clock auction

Recently, the combinatorial clock auction has become more and more common in the auctioning of telecommunication licenses. Although the auction design is complex, the promise is that bidding becomes simple - truthtelling is close to optimal. We show that this claim is too strong. The auction entails several strategic complexities which make bidding non-trivial.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: 24th European Regional Conference of the International Telecommunications Society (ITS): "Technology, Investment and Uncertainty", Florence, Italy, 20th-23rd October, 2013

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
combinatorial clock auction

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Knapek, Stephan
Wambach, Achim
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
International Telecommunications Society (ITS)
(where)
Calgary
(when)
2013

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

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Object type

  • Konferenzbeitrag

Associated

  • Knapek, Stephan
  • Wambach, Achim
  • International Telecommunications Society (ITS)

Time of origin

  • 2013

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