Konferenzbeitrag
Strategic complexities in the combinatorial clock auction
Recently, the combinatorial clock auction has become more and more common in the auctioning of telecommunication licenses. Although the auction design is complex, the promise is that bidding becomes simple - truthtelling is close to optimal. We show that this claim is too strong. The auction entails several strategic complexities which make bidding non-trivial.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: 24th European Regional Conference of the International Telecommunications Society (ITS): "Technology, Investment and Uncertainty", Florence, Italy, 20th-23rd October, 2013
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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combinatorial clock auction
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Knapek, Stephan
Wambach, Achim
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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International Telecommunications Society (ITS)
- (where)
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Calgary
- (when)
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2013
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Konferenzbeitrag
Associated
- Knapek, Stephan
- Wambach, Achim
- International Telecommunications Society (ITS)
Time of origin
- 2013