Arbeitspapier
Strategic complexities in the combinatorial clock auction
Recently, the combinatorial clock auction has become more and more common in the auctioning of telecommunication licenses. Although the auction design is complex, the promise is that bidding becomes simple - truthtelling is close to optimal. We show that this claim is too strong. The auction entails several strategic complexities which make bidding non-trivial.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3983
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Auctions
Telecommunications
- Subject
-
combinatorial clock auction
Auktionstheorie
Mobilkommunikation
Konzession
Lizenz
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Knapek, Stephan
Wambach, Achim
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
-
Munich
- (when)
-
2012
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Knapek, Stephan
- Wambach, Achim
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2012
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