Arbeitspapier
Characterizing the vickrey combinatorial auction by induction
This note studies the allocation of heterogeneous commodities to agents whose private values for combinations of these commodities are monotonic by inclusion. This setting can accommodate the presence of complementarity and substitutability among the heterogeneous commodities. By using induction logic, we provide an elementary proof of Holmstrom's (1919) characterization of the Vickrey combinatorial auction as the unique efficient, strategy-proof, and individually rational allocation rule. Our proof method can also be applied to domains to which his proof cannot be.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 631
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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Auktionstheorie
Privatisierung
Allokation
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Hong, Chew Soo
Shigehiro, Serizawa
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
- (where)
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Osaka
- (when)
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2005
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Hong, Chew Soo
- Shigehiro, Serizawa
- Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Time of origin
- 2005
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