Konferenzbeitrag
Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types
This paper studies optimal auction design when the seller can affect the buyers' valuations through an unobservable ex ante investment. The key insight is that the optimal mechanism may have the seller play a mixed investment strategy so as to create correlation between the otherwise (conditionally) independent valuations of buyers. The paper establishes conditions under which the seller can, in fact, extract the first best surplus almost fully.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Auctions with Asymmetric Information ; No. A13-V1
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Auctions
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Subject
-
Auction
ex ante investment
full surplus extraction
correlation
mechanism design
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Krähmer, Daniel
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Verein für Socialpolitik
- (where)
-
Frankfurt a. M.
- (when)
-
2010
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Konferenzbeitrag
Associated
- Krähmer, Daniel
- Verein für Socialpolitik
Time of origin
- 2010
Other Objects (12)
Uninformed buyers and market efficiency
Strategic Buyers and Market Entry
Advance-Purchase Financing of Projects with Few Buyers
The factors influencingthenon-usage of smart TVservicesbyKorean buyers
Promises and Social Distance in Buyer-Determined Procurement Auctions
Information Disclosure in Dynamic Buyer-Determined Procurement Auctions: An Empirical Study
Housing Ranking: a model of equilibrium between buyers and sellers expectations
Auction design in strategic freight procurement
An Auction Market for Journal Articles
Second-Chance Offers and Buyer Reputation: Theory and Evidence on Auctions with Default
Strategic complexities in the combinatorial clock auction
Reply relations in CMC: types and annotation
Uninformed buyers and market efficiency
Strategic Buyers and Market Entry
Advance-Purchase Financing of Projects with Few Buyers
The factors influencingthenon-usage of smart TVservicesbyKorean buyers
Promises and Social Distance in Buyer-Determined Procurement Auctions
Information Disclosure in Dynamic Buyer-Determined Procurement Auctions: An Empirical Study
Housing Ranking: a model of equilibrium between buyers and sellers expectations
Auction design in strategic freight procurement
An Auction Market for Journal Articles
Second-Chance Offers and Buyer Reputation: Theory and Evidence on Auctions with Default
Strategic complexities in the combinatorial clock auction
Reply relations in CMC: types and annotation
Uninformed buyers and market efficiency
Strategic Buyers and Market Entry
Advance-Purchase Financing of Projects with Few Buyers
The factors influencingthenon-usage of smart TVservicesbyKorean buyers
Promises and Social Distance in Buyer-Determined Procurement Auctions
Information Disclosure in Dynamic Buyer-Determined Procurement Auctions: An Empirical Study
Housing Ranking: a model of equilibrium between buyers and sellers expectations
Auction design in strategic freight procurement
An Auction Market for Journal Articles
Second-Chance Offers and Buyer Reputation: Theory and Evidence on Auctions with Default
Strategic complexities in the combinatorial clock auction