Konferenzbeitrag
An Auction Market for Journal Articles
We recommend that an auction market replace the current system for submitting academic papers and show a strict Pareto-improvement of equilibrium. Besides the benefits of speed, this mechanmism increases the average quality of articles and journals and rewards editors and referees for their effort. In addition, the academic dollars for papers sold at auction go to the authors, editors and referees of cited articles. This nonpecuniary income indicates academic impact - facilitating decisions on tenure and promotion. We discuss practical issues and demonstrate that the auction market is implementable without relaxing editors' current pecuniary or time constraints.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Improving Productivity and Efficiency of Economic Science ; No. A2-V1
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Role of Economics; Role of Economists; Market for Economists
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Auctions
- Thema
-
Academic Journals
Academic Productivity
Market Design
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Prüfer, Jens
Zetland, David
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Verein für Socialpolitik
- (wo)
-
Frankfurt a. M.
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Konferenzbeitrag
Beteiligte
- Prüfer, Jens
- Zetland, David
- Verein für Socialpolitik
Entstanden
- 2010
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