Performance measurement and incentive plans

Arbeitspapier

This paper explores performance measurement in incentive plans. Based on theory, we argue that differences in the nature of jobs between blue- and white-collar employees lead to differences in incentive systems. We find that performance measurement for white-collar workers is broader in terms of the performance measures, the organizational level of performance measurement and the time horizon. The intensity of incentives is also stronger for white-collar employees. All of these findings are consistent with theory.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: ETLA Discussion Papers ; No. 1216

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects ; Personnel Economics: Labor Management
• Thema: Incentive pay ; performance measurement ; risk versus distortion trade-off ; agency theory ; Leistungsorientierte Vergütung ; Performance-Messung ; Angestellte ; Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Kauhanen, Antti ; Napari, Sami
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA)
• (wo): Helsinki
• (wann): 2010

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/44527
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 20.09.2024, 08:20 MESZ