Auctions with imperfect commitment when the reserve may signal the auctioneer's type

Arbeitspapier

If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by not bidding, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer's type, which drives a unique separating and a multitude of pooling equilibria. If one eliminates belief systems that violate the intuitive criterion, one obtains a unique equilibrium reserve price equal to the seller's own valuation. Paradoxically, even if bidders initially believe that the auctioneer is bound by his reserve almost with certainty, commitment has no value.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 403

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Firm Behavior: Theory ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Auctions ; Rationing; Licensing
• Thema: Auctions ; signalling ; mechanism design

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Jun, Byoung Heon ; Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
• (wo): München
• (wann): 2013

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.15653
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93904
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-15653-6
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ