Prizes and Lemons: Procurement of Innovation under Imperfect Commitment

Arbeitspapier

The literature on R&D contests implicitly assumes that contestants submit their innovation regardless of its value. This ignores a potential adverse selection problem. The present paper analyzes the procurement of innovations when the procurer cannot commit to never bargain with innovators who bypass the contest. We compare ?xed-prize tournaments with and without entry fees, and optimal scoring auctions with and without minimum score requirement. Our main result is that the optimal ?xed-prize tournament is more pro?table than the optimal auction since preventing bypass is more costly in the optimal auction.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 262

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft
• Thema: innovation ; contests ; tournaments ; auctions ; bargaining ; adverse ; Innovationswettbewerb ; Extensives Spiel ; Auktionstheorie ; Innovation ; Beschaffung ; Verhandlungstheorie ; Adverse Selektion ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Ding, Wei ; Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
• (wo): München
• (wann): 2009

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13290
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93822
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13290-4
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ