Arbeitspapier
Auctions with Imperfect Commitment when the Reserve May Serve as a Signal
If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by strategic non-participation, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer's type, which drives a unique separating and a multitude of pooling equilibria. If one eliminates belief systems that violate the intuitive criterion , one obtains a unique equilibrium reserve price equal to the seller's own valuation. Paradoxically, even if bidders initially believe that the auctioneer is bound by his reserve almost with certainty, commitment has no value.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4586
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Firm Behavior: Theory
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Auctions
Rationing; Licensing
- Thema
-
auctions
signaling
imperfect commitment
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Jun, Byoung Heon
Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Jun, Byoung Heon
- Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2014
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