Hypothetical thinking and the winner's curse: An experimental investigation

Konferenzbeitrag

There is evidence that bidders fall prey to the winner's curse because they fail to extract information from hypothetical events - like winning an auction. This paper investigates experimentally whether bidders in a common value auction perform better when the requirements for this cognitive issue – also denoted by contingent reasoning - are relaxed, leaving all other parameters unchanged. The overall pattern of the data suggests that the problem of irrational over- and underbidding can be weakened by giving the subjects ex ante feedback about their bid, but unlike related studies I also find negative effects of additional information.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2018: Digitale Wirtschaft - Session: Poster Session Experiments ; No. P02-V3

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Auctions ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
• Thema: Hypothetical thinking ; cursed equilibrium ; winner's curse

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Moser, Johannes
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
• (wo): Kiel, Hamburg
• (wann): 2018

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/181506
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ