The Swing Voter's Curse in Social Networks

Konferenzbeitrag

We study private communication in social networks prior to a majority vote on two alternative policies. Some (or all) agents receive a private imperfect signal about which policy is correct. They can, but need not, recommend a policy to their neighbors in the social network prior to the vote. We show that communication can undermine effciency of the vote and hence reduce welfare in a common interest setting. We test the model in a lab experiment and find strong support for the predicted effects.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Networks, Organizations and Firms ; No. D09-V2

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness ; Network Formation and Analysis: Theory ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Mechtenberg, Lydia ; Büchel, Berno
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
• (where): Kiel, Hamburg
• (when): 2017

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/168094
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET