Natural-resource rents and internal conflicts - Can decentralization lift the curse?

Konferenzbeitrag

We study how natural-resource rents a ffect the risk of internal conflict within countries and how the federal structure of countries influences this relationship. Natural-resource abundance may induce excessive rent-seeking and thus increase the risk of internal conflict. Fiscal and political decentralization as an institutional arrangement for rent-sharing and political codetermination of regions within a country may limit the destructive e ffect of the natural-resource rents on internal stability. Using cross-country and panel data covering the period 1984{2004 from more than 90 countries, we find evidence that natural-resource rents indeed increase the risk of internal conflict, but this relationship is signi cantly mitigated by decentralization.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Environment, Regions, and Innovation ; No. B04-V1

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts ; Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession ; Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies: Natural Resources; Energy; Environment

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Markwardt, Gunther ; Farzanegan, Mohammad ; Leßmann, Christian
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
• (where): Kiel und Hamburg
• (when): 2013

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79940
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET