Natural-Resource Rents and Internal Conflicts - Can Decentralization Lift the Curse?

Arbeitspapier

We study how natural-resource rents affect the risk of internal conflict within countries and how the federal structure of countries influences this relationship. Natural-resource abundance may induce excessive rent-seeking and thus increase the risk of internal conflict. Fiscal and political decentralization as an institutional arrangement for rent-sharing and political codetermination of regions within a country may limit the destructive effect of the natural-resource rents on internal stability. Using cross-country and panel data covering the period 1984-2004 from more than 90 countries, we find evidence that natural-resource rents indeed increase the risk of internal conflict, but this relationship is significantly mitigated by decentralization.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4180

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession ; Other Economic Systems: Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies ; Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts ; Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation: Government Policy
• Subject: natural resources ; risk of conflict ; decentralization

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Farzanegan, Mohammad Reza ; Lessmann, Christian ; Markwardt, Gunther
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2013

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71167
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET