Arbeitspapier
Profitable Horizontal Mergers without Cost Advantages: The Role of Internal Organization, Information, and Market Structure
Merged firms are typically rather complex organizations. Accordingly, merger has a more profound effect on the structure of a market than simply reducing the number of competitors. We show that this may render horizontal mergers profitable and welfare-improving even if costs are linear. The driving force behind these results, which help to reconcile theory with various empirical findings, is the assumption that information about output decisions flows more freely within a merged firm.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 435
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Subject
-
Merger
internal organizational structure
information
timing
market structure
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Huck, Steffen
Konrad, Kai A.
Müller, Wieland
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
-
2001
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Huck, Steffen
- Konrad, Kai A.
- Müller, Wieland
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2001
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