Moral cost, commitment, and committee size

Arbeitspapier

Consider a committee that in the past has made a promise not to confiscate the profits from a foreign investor. After the investment has taken place, there is a material benefit if the committee decides to default on the earlier promise. But there are also some small moral costs for those who vote in favor of default. We show that in such situations small committees are more likely to default than large committees. Thus, constituencies can decide about degrees of commitment by choosing committee sizes appropriately. Experimental data confirms our predictions.

Object Details

• Alternative title: Moralische Kosten, Selbstbindung und die Größe von Komitees
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2003-31

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
• Subject: coordination ; commitment ; democracy ; voting

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Huck, Steffen ; Konrad, Kai A.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
• (where): Berlin
• (when): 2003

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51085
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET