Moral cost, commitment, and committee size

Arbeitspapier

Consider a committee that in the past has made a promise not to confiscate the profits from a foreign investor. After the investment has taken place, there is a material benefit if the committee decides to default on the earlier promise. But there are also some small moral costs for those who vote in favor of default. We show that in such situations small committees are more likely to default than large committees. Thus, constituencies can decide about degrees of commitment by choosing committee sizes appropriately. Experimental data confirms our predictions.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Weitere Titel: Moralische Kosten, Selbstbindung und die Größe von Komitees
• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2003-31

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
• Thema: coordination ; commitment ; democracy ; voting

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Huck, Steffen ; Konrad, Kai A.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
• (wo): Berlin
• (wann): 2003

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51085
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ