Finitely repeated games with social preferences

Arbeitspapier

A well—known result from the theory of finitely repeated games states that if the stage game has a unique equilibrium, then there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the finitely repeated game in which the equilibrium of the stage game is being played in every period. Here I show that this result does in general not hold anymore if players have social preferences of the form frequently assumed in the recent literature, for example in the inequity aversion models of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). In fact, repeating the unique stage game equilibrium may not be a subgame perfect equilibrium at all.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Discussion Paper Series ; No. 515

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Subject: social preferences ; finitely repeated games ; inequity aversion ; ERC ; Wiederholte Spiele ; Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion ; Gerechtigkeit ; Soziale Beziehungen ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Oechssler, Jörg
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
• (where): Heidelberg
• (when): 2011

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.11588/heidok.00012512
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/127332
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-opus-125120
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET