Arbeitspapier

A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games

I analyze the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria of any finitely repeated game with complete information and perfect monitoring. The main result is a complete characterization of the limit set, as the time horizon increases, of the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of the finitely repeated game. The same method can be used to fully characterize the limit set of the set of pure strategy Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of any the finitely repeated game.

Language: Englisch

Bibliographic citation: Series: Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers ; No. 584

Classification: Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games

Subject: Finitely Repeated Games
Pure Strategy
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
Limit Perfect Folk Theorem
Discount Factor

Event: Geistige Schöpfung

(who): Demeze-Jouatsa, Ghislain H.

Event: Veröffentlichung

(who): Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW)

(where): Bielefeld

(when): 2018

Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/201608

URN: urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29303825

Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

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Object type

Arbeitspapier

Associated

Demeze-Jouatsa, Ghislain H.
Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW)

Time of origin

2018

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