Artikel
A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games
This paper analyzes the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria of any finitely repeated game with complete information and perfect monitoring. The main result is a complete characterization of the limit set, as the time horizon increases, of the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of the finitely repeated game. This model includes the special case of observable mixed strategies.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: International Journal of Game Theory ; ISSN: 1432-1270 ; Volume: 49 ; Year: 2020 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 1129-1142 ; Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
- Thema
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Finitely repeated games
Pure strategy
Observable mixed strategies
Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
Limit perfect folk theorem
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Demeze-Jouatsa, Ghislain-Herman
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Springer
- (wo)
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Berlin, Heidelberg
- (wann)
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2020
- DOI
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doi:10.1007/s00182-020-00735-z
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Demeze-Jouatsa, Ghislain-Herman
- Springer
Entstanden
- 2020
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