Artikel
A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games
This paper analyzes the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria of any finitely repeated game with complete information and perfect monitoring. The main result is a complete characterization of the limit set, as the time horizon increases, of the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of the finitely repeated game. This model includes the special case of observable mixed strategies.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: International Journal of Game Theory ; ISSN: 1432-1270 ; Volume: 49 ; Year: 2020 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 1129-1142 ; Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
- Subject
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Finitely repeated games
Pure strategy
Observable mixed strategies
Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
Limit perfect folk theorem
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Demeze-Jouatsa, Ghislain-Herman
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Springer
- (where)
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Berlin, Heidelberg
- (when)
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2020
- DOI
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doi:10.1007/s00182-020-00735-z
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Demeze-Jouatsa, Ghislain-Herman
- Springer
Time of origin
- 2020
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