Arbeitspapier
On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation: The case of non-linear utilities
We extend the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation established by Gershkov et al. (Econometrica, 2013) to environments with non-linear utilities satisfying the average single-crossing property and the convex-valued assumption. The new equivalence result produces novel implications to the literature on the principal-agent problem with allocative externalities, environmental mechanism design, and public good provision.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 212
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Subject
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Bayesian implementation
dominant strategy implementation
mechanism design
non-linear utilities
single-crossing
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Kushnir, Alexey
Liu, Shuo
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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University of Zurich, Department of Economics
- (where)
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Zurich
- (when)
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2015
- DOI
-
doi:10.5167/uzh-115786
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Kushnir, Alexey
- Liu, Shuo
- University of Zurich, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2015
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