Arbeitspapier
On the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation: The case of correlated types
We consider general social choice environments with private values and correlated types. Each agent's matrix of conditional probabilities satisfies the full rank condition. We show that for any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism there exists a dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism that delivers the same interim expected utilities to all agents and generates at least the same social surplus. In addition, if there is a social alternative that is inferior to the other alternatives for all agents the dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism matches exactly the social surplus. These results extend to environments with interdependent values satisfying the single crossing condition.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 129
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
-
mechanism design
Bayesian implementation
dominant strategy implementation
full surplus extraction
correlation
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kushnir, Alexey
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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University of Zurich, Department of Economics
- (wo)
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Zurich
- (wann)
-
2013
- DOI
-
doi:10.5167/uzh-79952
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kushnir, Alexey
- University of Zurich, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2013
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