Arbeitspapier
International games on climate change control
In this paper an n-player non-co-operative game is used to model countries' decision of whether or not to sign an international agreement on climate change control. The stable coalition structure of the game is defined and then computed for a climate game in which the role of carbon leakage is also taken into account. At the equilibrium, a coalition may emerge despite the public good nature of climate. The size of the coalition depends on the degree of interdependence of countries' emission strategies, and on the type of conjectures that each country forms on the consequences of its own decision to join or to defect from the environmental coalition.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 22.1998
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Public Goods
Energy: General
Energy: Government Policy
- Thema
-
Climate change
Non co-operative game theory
Endogenous formation of coalition
Rational conjectures
International agreements
Umweltabkommen
Klimawandel
Spieltheorie
Koalition
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Carraro, Carlo
Moriconi, Francesca
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
1998
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Carraro, Carlo
- Moriconi, Francesca
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 1998
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