An evolutionary approach to the climate change negotiation game

Arbeitspapier

We describe in this paper an evolutionary game theoretic model aiming at representing the climate change negotiation. The model is used to examine the outcome of climate change negotiations in a framework which seeks to closely represent negotiation patterns. Evolutionary setting allows us to consider a decision making structure characterised by agents with bounded knowledge practising mimics and learning from past events and strategies. We show on that framework that a third significant alternative to the binary coordination-defection strategies needs to be considered: a unilateral commitment as precautionary strategy. As a means to widen cooperation, we examine the influence of linking environmental and trade policies via the implementation of a trade penalty on non cooperative behaviours.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 81.2001

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions ; Renewable Resources and Conservation: Government Policy
• Subject: Environmental negotiation ; coalition ; precautionary unilateral commitment ; evolutionary process ; Klimaschutz ; Umweltabkommen ; Verhandlungen ; Evolutionäre Spieltheorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Courtois, Pierre ; Péreau, Jean Christophe ; Tazdaït, Tarik
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (where): Milano
• (when): 2001

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/155244
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET