North-South Climate Change Negotiations: a Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information

Arbeitspapier

This article determines the conditions under which the Southern countries should act together, or separately, while negotiating with the North about climate change policy and about the conditions for future Southern engagement. The paper models the international negotiations with complete and with asymmetric information in a dynamic framework. Results show that, depending on their characteristics, the different players can obtain benefits delaying the moment of the agreement.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 9.2003

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions ; Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
• Subject: Bargaining theory ; asymmetric information ; climate change ; international cooperation ; Klimaschutz ; Umweltabkommen ; Verhandlungen ; Nord-Süd-Beziehungen ; Verhandlungstheorie ; Asymmetrische Information ; Theorie ; Welt

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Caparrós, Alejandro ; Pereau, Jean-Christophe ; Tazdaït, Tarik
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (where): Milano
• (when): 2003

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/118035
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET