Arbeitspapier
North-South Climate Change Negotiations: a Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information
This article determines the conditions under which the Southern countries should act together, or separately, while negotiating with the North about climate change policy and about the conditions for future Southern engagement. The paper models the international negotiations with complete and with asymmetric information in a dynamic framework. Results show that, depending on their characteristics, the different players can obtain benefits delaying the moment of the agreement.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 9.2003
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
- Thema
-
Bargaining theory
asymmetric information
climate change
international cooperation
Klimaschutz
Umweltabkommen
Verhandlungen
Nord-Süd-Beziehungen
Verhandlungstheorie
Asymmetrische Information
Theorie
Welt
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Caparrós, Alejandro
Pereau, Jean-Christophe
Tazdaït, Tarik
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
2003
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Caparrós, Alejandro
- Pereau, Jean-Christophe
- Tazdaït, Tarik
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 2003