- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Identifier
-
1053569971
- Reihe
-
Working paper series / Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability; 36
Thema
Agency-Theorie; Verbraucherschutz
Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
- URN
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
26.01.2023, 13:57 MEZ
Objekttyp
- Monografie
Beteiligte
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Misselling (financial) products: the limits for internal compliance
Misselling through agents
CEO replacement under private information
A lender-based theory of collateral
A theory of the boundaries of banks with implications for financial integration and regulation
"Irresponsible lending" with a better informed lender
Bank capital structure and credit decisions
Loan origination under soft- and hard-information lending
Early-stage financing and firm growth in new industries
Innovation, endogenous overinvestment, and incentive pay
Banking competition and risk-taking when borrowers care about financial prudence
Financial literacy and savings account returns
Misselling (financial) products: the limits for internal compliance
Misselling through agents
CEO replacement under private information
A lender-based theory of collateral
A theory of the boundaries of banks with implications for financial integration and regulation
"Irresponsible lending" with a better informed lender
Bank capital structure and credit decisions
Loan origination under soft- and hard-information lending
Early-stage financing and firm growth in new industries
Innovation, endogenous overinvestment, and incentive pay
Banking competition and risk-taking when borrowers care about financial prudence
Financial literacy and savings account returns
Misselling (financial) products: the limits for internal compliance
Misselling through agents
CEO replacement under private information
A lender-based theory of collateral
A theory of the boundaries of banks with implications for financial integration and regulation
"Irresponsible lending" with a better informed lender
Bank capital structure and credit decisions
Loan origination under soft- and hard-information lending
Early-stage financing and firm growth in new industries
Innovation, endogenous overinvestment, and incentive pay
Banking competition and risk-taking when borrowers care about financial prudence