Arbeitspapier

Capital Regulation and Tail Risk

The paper studies risk mitigation associated with capital regulation, in a context when banks may choose tail risk assets. We show that this undermines the traditional result that higher capital reduces excess risk-taking driven by limited liability. When capital raising is costly, poorly capitalized banks may limit risk to avoid breaching the minimal capital ratio. A bank with higher capital has lesschance of breaching the ratio, so may actually take more risk. As a result, banks which have access to tail risk projects may take greater risk when highly capitalized.The results are consistent with stylized facts about pre-crisis bank behavior, and suggest implications for the optimal design of capital regulation.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 11-039/2/DSF14

Classification
Wirtschaft
Economic Development: Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
Subject
Bank Regulation
Risk Shifting
Capital Requirements
Tail Risk
Systemic Risk
Bankrisiko
Basler Akkord
Bankenliquidität
Bankenregulierung

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Perotti, Enrico
Ratnovski, Lev
Vlahu, Razvan
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Tinbergen Institute
(where)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(when)
2011

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Perotti, Enrico
  • Ratnovski, Lev
  • Vlahu, Razvan
  • Tinbergen Institute

Time of origin

  • 2011

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