Sharing Information through Delegation and Collaboration

Arbeitspapier

This article analyzes under which conditions a manager can motivate a junior worker by verbal communication, and explains why communication is often tied up with organizational choices as job enlargement and collaboration. Our model has two important features. First, the manager has more information about a junior's ability than the junior himself. Second, the junior's effort and ability are complements. We show that the manager has an incentive to exaggerate the junior's ability. We discuss two ways in which the manager can make credible statements about the junior's ability. First, the senior can delegate a task to the junior for which it is important that the junior has a correct perception of his ability. Information is shared through a costless signal. Second, the senior can spend more time on a junior she perceives as able than on a junior she perceives as less able. Information is then shared through a costly signal.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 04-042/1

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General ; Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
• Subject: Communication ; incentives ; signalling ; overconfidence ; delegation ; collaboration ; Leistungsanreiz ; Kooperative Führung ; Interne Kommunikation

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Swank, Otto H. ; Visser, Bauke
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Tinbergen Institute
• (where): Amsterdam and Rotterdam
• (when): 2004

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86429
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET