Arbeitspapier
On Positive Value of Information in Risk Sharing
We develop a novel argument why better public information can help countries to insure against idiosyncratic risk. Representative agents of developing and industrial countries receive public and private signals on their future income realization and engage in risk-sharing contracts with limited enforceability. Better public information has two opposite effects. First, it has a detrimental effect on risk sharing by limiting risk-sharing possibilities as emphasized by Hirshleifer (1971). Second, it mitigates the adverse selection problem resulting from private information which improves risk sharing. We find that better public information in developing countries ameliorates risk sharing in both developing and industrial countries.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 15-074/VI
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Macroeconomics: Consumption; Saving; Wealth
Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
Incomplete Markets
- Thema
-
Social value of information
Sovereign risk
Limited enforcement
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Denderski, Piotr
Stoltenberg, Christian
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Denderski, Piotr
- Stoltenberg, Christian
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2015
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