- Location
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISSN
-
1573-7187
- Extent
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Online-Ressource
- Language
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Englisch
- Notes
-
online resource.
- Bibliographic citation
-
Small group forecasting using proportional-prize contests ; day:22 ; month:6 ; year:2021 ; pages:1-25
Theory and decision ; (22.6.2021), 1-25
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Creator
- Contributor
-
SpringerLink (Online service)
- DOI
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10.1007/s11238-021-09825-0
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2021100906532072063386
- Rights
-
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
-
15.08.2025, 7:29 AM CEST
Data provider
This object is provided by:
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- Peeters, Ronald
- Rao, Fan
- Wolk, Leonard
- SpringerLink (Online service)
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