The Impact of Envy on Relational Employment Contracts
Abstract: We study the effects of envy on relational employment contracts in a standard moral hazard setup with two agents. Performance is evaluated via an observable, but non-contractible signal which reects an agent's individual contribution to firm value. Both agents exhibit horizontal disadvantageous inequity aversion. In contrast to the literature, we find that inequity aversion may be beneficial; in the presence of envy, for a certain range of interest rates, relational contracts may be more profitable. For some interest rates reputational equilibria exist only with envious agents
- Standort
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
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Online-Ressource
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Anmerkungen
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Postprint
begutachtet (peer reviewed)
In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ; 72 (2009) 2 ; 766-779
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
- DOI
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10.1016/j.jebo.2009.07.016
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-314388
- Rechteinformation
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Open Access unbekannt; Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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14.08.2025, 10:59 MESZ
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Beteiligte
Entstanden
- 2009
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