Arbeitspapier
Relational contracts and job design
This paper analyzes the problem of optimal job design when there is only one contractible and imperfect performance measure for all tasks whose contribution to firm value is non-verifiable. I find that task splitting is optimal when relational contracts based on firm value are not feasible. By contrast, if an agent who performs a given set of tasks receives an implicit bonus, the principal always benefits from assigning an additional task to this agent.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: SFB 649 Discussion Paper ; No. 2005,052
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
Personnel Economics: Labor Management
- Subject
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job design
multi-tasking
relational contracts
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Schöttner, Anja
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk
- (where)
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Berlin
- (when)
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2005
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Schöttner, Anja
- Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk
Time of origin
- 2005
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