Teams and Tournaments in Relational Contracts

Arbeitspapier

We analyze relational contracts for a set of agents when either (a) only aggregate output or (b) individual outputs are observable. A team incentive scheme, where each agent is paid a bonus for aggregate output above a threshold, is optimal in case (a). The team’s efficiency may increase considerably with size if outputs are negatively correlated. Under (b) a tournament scheme with a threshold is optimal, where the threshold, for correlated outputs, depends on an agent’s relative performance. The two cases reveal that it may be optimal to organize production as a team where only aggregate output is observable.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4783

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Information and Uncertainty: Other ; Time Allocation, Work Behavior, and Employment Determination: Other ; Organization of Production ; Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
• Thema: relational contracts ; teams ; tournaments

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Kvaløy, Ola ; Olsen, Trond
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2014

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/96886
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ