Incentives, Efficiency and Quality in Regulated Monopolies under Customer Ownership

Arbeitspapier

We extend the theory of monopoly regulation under imperfect information to the case of customer, rather than investor, ownership. The firm's manager can exert two types of effort - a contractible effort to reduce costs, and a non-contractible effort to increase quality. The former decreases expected costs and increases expected profits, while the latter increases expected demand, costs and consumer surplus. We show that the manager faces a conflict between pursuing cost reductions and quality when his or her net marginal disutility of cost-reducing effort is sufficiently increased by quality-enhancing effort. We further show that this conflict can arise even without an effort substitution effect. Thus stronger incentives (i.e. a higher managerial profit share) induce greater cost-reducing effort, but lower quality-enhancing effort. Since customer owners value consumer surplus as well as profits, they optimally provide the manager with weaker incentives than investor owners - who only value profits - for a given regulated price. This implies higher quality but lower efficiency under customer ownership, given price. A customer-owned firm is optimally set a tighter price cap than an investor-owned firm if its profits are less price-sensitive than is relative consumer surplus. This can result in quality differences being reduced between ownership types, but with ambiguous impacts on efficiency differences. Failure to account for ownership-related differences in objective functions gives rise to regulatory distortions.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Economics Working Paper Series ; No. 2015/05

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; Economics of Regulation ; Electric Utilities ; Gas Utilities; Pipelines; Water Utilities ; Cooperative Enterprises
• Subject: Regulation ; Moral Hazard ; Cooperatives ; Electric Utilities ; Gas ; Water Utilities ; Profit Sharing

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Meade, Richard
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Auckland University of Technology (AUT), Faculty of Business, Economics and Law
• (where): Auckland
• (when): 2015

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/242536
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET