Privatization, Investment and Ownership Efficiency

Arbeitspapier

We provide a model that explains the following empirical observations: i) private ownership is more efficient than public ownership, ii) privatizations are associated with increases in efficiency and iii) the increase in efficiency predates the privatization. The two key mechanisms explaining the results are: (i) a government owner keeping control takes into account the negative effect on employment of investment and (ii) a privatizing government has a stronger incentive to invest than an acquiring firm: the government exploits the fact that investments increase the sales price not only due to the increase in the acquirer's profit, but also due to a reduced profit for the non-acquirer.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IFN Working Paper ; No. 744

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Auctions ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out ; Antitrust Issues and Policies: General ; Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions
• Thema: Privatization ; Asset Ownership ; Restructuring ; Oligopoly ; Privatisierung ; Unternehmenserfolg ; Investition ; Eigentümerstruktur ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Friberg, Richard ; Norbäck, Pehr-Johan ; Persson, Lars
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
• (wo): Stockholm
• (wann): 2008

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/81210
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ