Arbeitspapier
Fighting Mobile Crime
Two countries set their enforcement non-cooperatively to deter native and foreign individuals from committing crime in their territory. Crime is mobile, ex ante (migration) and ex post (fleeing), and criminals hiding abroad after having com- mitted a crime in a country must be extradited back. When extradition is not too costly, countries overinvest in enforcement: insourcing foreign criminals is more costly than paying the extradition cost. When extradition is sufficiently costly, in- stead, a large enforcement may induce criminals to flee the country whose law they infringed. The fear of paying the extradition cost enables the countries coordinating on the efficient outcome.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7446
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Criminal Law
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- Thema
-
crime
enforcement
extradition
fleeing
migration
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Crinò, Rosario
Immordino, Giovanni
Piccolo, Salvatore
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2019
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Crinò, Rosario
- Immordino, Giovanni
- Piccolo, Salvatore
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2019