Arbeitspapier

Fighting Mobile Crime

Two countries set their enforcement non-cooperatively to deter native and foreign individuals from committing crime in their territory. Crime is mobile, ex ante (migration) and ex post (fleeing), and criminals hiding abroad after having com- mitted a crime in a country must be extradited back. When extradition is not too costly, countries overinvest in enforcement: insourcing foreign criminals is more costly than paying the extradition cost. When extradition is sufficiently costly, in- stead, a large enforcement may induce criminals to flee the country whose law they infringed. The fear of paying the extradition cost enables the countries coordinating on the efficient outcome.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7446

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Criminal Law
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Thema
crime
enforcement
extradition
fleeing
migration

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Crinò, Rosario
Immordino, Giovanni
Piccolo, Salvatore
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2019

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Crinò, Rosario
  • Immordino, Giovanni
  • Piccolo, Salvatore
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2019

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