Mobile criminals, immobile crime: The efficiency of decentralized crime deterrence

Arbeitspapier

In this paper we examine a class of local crimes that involve perfectly mobile criminals, and perfectly immobile criminal opportunities. We focus on local non-rival crime deterrence that is more efficient against criminals pursuing domestic crimes than criminals pursuing crimes elsewhere. In a standard case of sincerely delegated politicians and zero transfers to other districts, we show that centralized deterrence unambiguously dominates the decentralized deterrence. With strategic delegation and voluntary in-kind transfers, the tradeoff is exactly the opposite: Decentralization achieves the social optimum, whereas cooperative centralization overprovides for enforcement. This is robust to various cost-sharing modes. We also examine the effects of the growing interdependence of districts, stemming from criminals' increasing opportunities to strategically displace. Contrary to the supposition in Oates's decentralization theorem, increasing interdependence makes centralization less desirable.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IES Working Paper ; No. 18/2009

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Public Goods ; State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects ; State and Local Government: Other Expenditure Categories ; Regional Government Analysis: General
• Thema: crime mobility ; crime deterrence ; decentralization ; strategic delegation ; side payments ; Kriminalität ; Mobilität ; Kriminalitätsökonomik ; Kriminalpolitik ; Strafe

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Gregor, Martin ; Šťastná, Lenka
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Charles University in Prague, Institute of Economic Studies (IES)
• (wo): Prague
• (wann): 2009

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/83428
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ