Deterrence works for criminals

Arbeitspapier

Criminal law and economics rests on the expectation that deterrence incentives can be employed to reduce crime. Prison survey evidence however suggests that a majority of criminals are biased and may not react to deterrence incentives. This study employs an extra-laboratory experiment in a German prison to test the effectiveness of deterrence. Subjects either face potential punishment when stealing, or they can steal without deterrence. We confirm Gary Becker's deterrence hypothesis that deterrence works for criminals.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Kiel Working Paper ; No. 1938

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Field Experiments ; Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
• Thema: Crime ; Stealing ; Deterrence ; Prison ; Extra-laboratory experiment ; Artefactual field experiment

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Khadjavi, Menusch
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
• (wo): Kiel
• (wann): 2014

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/100076
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ