Arbeitspapier
Marginal Deterrence at Work
We test the rational economic model of marginal deterrence of law enforcement - i.e., the need for graduating the penalty to the severity of the crime. We combine individual-level data on sentence length for a representative sample of US inmates with proxies for maximum punishment and monitoring costs across US states over 50 years. Consistent with the theory of marginal deterrence, we show that sentence length is increasing in maximum penalty and decreasing in monitoring cost. We also provide evidence that steeper sanctions are associated with less severe crimes, consistent with marginal deterrence being e¤ective. Overall, these findings favor the marginal deterrence framework over competing theories of justice.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6665
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Criminal Law
Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior: General
- Subject
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marginal deterrence
enforcement policies
individual-level data
death penalty
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Crinò, Rosario
Immordino, Giovanni
Piccolo, Salvatore
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
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2017
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Crinò, Rosario
- Immordino, Giovanni
- Piccolo, Salvatore
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2017