Arbeitspapier

Marginal Deterrence at Work

We test the rational economic model of marginal deterrence of law enforcement - i.e., the need for graduating the penalty to the severity of the crime. We combine individual-level data on sentence length for a representative sample of US inmates with proxies for maximum punishment and monitoring costs across US states over 50 years. Consistent with the theory of marginal deterrence, we show that sentence length is increasing in maximum penalty and decreasing in monitoring cost. We also provide evidence that steeper sanctions are associated with less severe crimes, consistent with marginal deterrence being e¤ective. Overall, these findings favor the marginal deterrence framework over competing theories of justice.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6665

Classification
Wirtschaft
Criminal Law
Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior: General
Subject
marginal deterrence
enforcement policies
individual-level data
death penalty

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Crinò, Rosario
Immordino, Giovanni
Piccolo, Salvatore
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2017

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Crinò, Rosario
  • Immordino, Giovanni
  • Piccolo, Salvatore
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2017

Other Objects (12)