Marginal Deterrence at Work

Arbeitspapier

We test the rational economic model of marginal deterrence of law enforcement - i.e., the need for graduating the penalty to the severity of the crime. We combine individual-level data on sentence length for a representative sample of US inmates with proxies for maximum punishment and monitoring costs across US states over 50 years. Consistent with the theory of marginal deterrence, we show that sentence length is increasing in maximum penalty and decreasing in monitoring cost. We also provide evidence that steeper sanctions are associated with less severe crimes, consistent with marginal deterrence being e¤ective. Overall, these findings favor the marginal deterrence framework over competing theories of justice.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6665

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Criminal Law ; Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior: General
• Subject: marginal deterrence ; enforcement policies ; individual-level data ; death penalty

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Crinò, Rosario ; Immordino, Giovanni ; Piccolo, Salvatore
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2017

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/171129
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET