Fighting collusion: An implementation theory approach

Arbeitspapier

A competition authority has an objective, which specifies what output profile firms need to produce as a function of production costs. These costs change over time and are only known by the firms. The objective is implementable if inequilibrium, the firms cannot collude on their reports to the competition authority.Assuming that the firms can only report prices and quantities, we characterize what objectives are one-shot and repeatedly implementable.We use this characterization to identify conditions when the competitive output is implementable. We extend the analysis to the cases when a buyer also knows the private information of firms and when the firms can supply hard evidence about their costs.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Cardiff Economics Working Papers ; No. E2021/19

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
• Thema: Collusion ; Antitrust ; (Repeated) Implementation ; Monotonicity ; Price-Quantity Mechanism ; Hard Evidence

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Azacis, Helmuts ; Vida, Péter
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
• (wo): Cardiff
• (wann): 2021

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/250343
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ