The γ-Core and Coalition Formation

Arbeitspapier

This paper reinterprets the ? -core (Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)) and justifies it as well as its prediction that the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. It is assumed that coalitions can freely merge or break apart, are farsighted (that is, it is the final and not the immediate payoffs that matter to the coalitions) and a coalition may deviate if and only if it stands to gain from it. It is then shown that subsequent to a deviation by a coalition, the nonmembers will have incentives to break apart into singletons, as is assumed in the definition of the ? - characteristic function, and that the grand coalition is the only stable coalition structure.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 94.2003

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Cooperative Games ; Noncooperative Games ; Externalities
• Subject: Core ; Characteristic function ; Strategic games ; Coalition formation ; Core ; Spieltheorie ; Koalition ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Chander, Parkash
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (where): Milano
• (when): 2003

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/118126
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET