Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation

Arbeitspapier

Assume that players strictly rank each other as coalition partners. We propose a procedure whereby they fall back on their preferences, yielding internally compatible, or coherent, majority coalition(s), which we call fallback coalitions. If there is more than one fallback coalition, the players common to them, or kingmakers, determine which fallback coalition will form. The players(s) who are the first to be acceptable to all other members of a fallback coalition are the leader(s) of that coalition. The effects of different preference assumptions-particularly, different kinds of single-peakedness - and of player weights on the number of coherent coalitions, their connectedness, and which players become kingmakers and leaders are investigated. The fallback procedure may be used (i) empirically to identify kingmakers and leaders or (ii) normatively to select them.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 41.2009

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Cooperative Games ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
• Subject: Coalition ; Fallback Process ; Kingmaker Leader ; Cardinally Single-peaked ; Ordinally Single-peaked

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Kilgour, Marc ; Brams, Steven J.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (where): Milano
• (when): 2009

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53209
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET