Arbeitspapier

Agenda control in coalition formation

Theoretical models of government formation in political science usually assume that the head of state is non-strategic. In this paper, we analyse the power of an agenda setter who chooses the order in which players are recognised to form coalitions in simple games. We characterise those sets of players which can be imposed in the equilibrium coalition and show that the only decisive structures where the agenda setter can impose the presence of any minimal winning coalition are apex games, where a large player forms a winning coalition with any of the small players.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 16. 2000

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Thema
Coalition formation
agenda control
government formation
Regierungskoalition
Staatsoberhaupt
Spieltheorie
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bloch, Francis
Rottier, Stéphane
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(wo)
Milano
(wann)
2000

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bloch, Francis
  • Rottier, Stéphane
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Entstanden

  • 2000

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